STATEMENT BY MR BRANDON LIM, FIRST SECRETARY (POLITICAL), PERMANENT MISSION OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE 2025 SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, 7 APRIL 2025
7 April 2025
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Thank you, Mr Chairman.
1 At the outset, allow me to extend my delegation’s congratulations on your election as Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). We also congratulate Mr Akaki Dvali of Georgia and Ms Julia Rodriguez of El Salvador on their election as Chairs of the Working Group on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and Working Group on emerging technologies in the context of international security respectively. I assure you of Singapore’s strong support and cooperation as we embark on the important work of this Commission.
2 Singapore aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and by Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN, and would like to make the following comments in our national capacity.
3 The UNDC is the sole, specialised, deliberative body that considers and makes recommendations on disarmament issues. Singapore welcomes the convening of the second session as an invaluable opportunity for Member States to continue the momentum of inclusive and constructive dialogue and work towards practical and concrete solutions to disarmament issues. An inclusive, open and multilateral approach is essential to address the issues of nuclear disarmament and the impact of emerging technologies on international security, particularly given the pace at which some of these emerging technologies are progressing.
4 Against the backdrop of an increasingly divided and deteriorating international security environment, Singapore reiterates our full commitment to the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as we strive towards the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We must use this opportunity for open dialogue to seek convergence on how to address current and future challenges. Allow me to make three points on how we can take such concrete steps forward.
5 First, we must uphold and strengthen our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We reiterate our disappointment at the failure since 2010 of successive NPT Review Conferences to adopt a final document, as well as the lack of substantive progress at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Eleventh NPT Review Conference last year. As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres pointed out at the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in February 2024, the risk of nuclear conflict is real and rising amidst heightened global security concerns and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Last September, all UN Member States undertook an important collective commitment to uphold our disarmament obligations as outlined in the Pact for the Future. We therefore urge all Member States to take concrete steps to achieve tangible progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and avoid actions that will contravene the objective and purpose of the NPT. We hope that the upcoming discussions at the Third NPT Preparatory Committee later this month will result in substantive discussions in this regard. We also reiterate our call for countries outside the ambit of the NPT to join, or rejoin, the NPT to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
6 Second, we must redouble our efforts towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as a key pillar of the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We regret the decision by the Russian Federation to revoke its ratification of the CTBT, and call on States to refrain from unravelling the substantial progress on the CTBT that the international community has achieved to date. We welcome the ratification of the CTBT by Papua New Guinea in March 2024 and reiterate our call on all remaining countries, particularly the remaining Annex II States, to ratify it as soon as possible without delay.
7 Third, nuclear weapon-free zones like the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) represent useful and concrete contributions towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We will continue to explore the possibility of allowing individual Nuclear Weapon States which are willing to sign and ratify the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty without reservations and provide formal assurance of this commitment in writing to go ahead with the signing. We reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage all the Nuclear Weapon States, including those with reservations, and intensify efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.
Mr Chairman,
8 Singapore welcomes the continued discussions of the agenda item on “recommendations on common understandings related to emerging technologies in the context of international security” under its Working Group II. We note the deliberations of the Working Group in the last UNDC session on achieving a more focused scope of discussion to ensure more substantial discussions and recommendations. To this end, we emphasise the importance of an inclusive, transparent and participatory process as we seek to build trust and a common discourse in this salient and rapidly developing area. At the same time, it is important to avoid the duplication of discussions and processes in other disarmament fora in New York and Geneva.
9 To conclude, Singapore looks forward to the constructive discussions and dialogue with other Member States to address the critical issues of nuclear weapons and emerging technologies in the context of international security. Thank you.
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