REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR VANU GOPALA MENON, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, AT THE WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON REFORMING INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, LUXEMBOURG, 15 JUNE 2011 ON 'TO WHAT EXTENT DOES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF LARGE AND SMALL COUNTRIES?'

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR VANU GOPALA MENON, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, AT THE WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON REFORMING INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, LUXEMBOURG, 15 JUNE 2011 ON 'TO WHAT EXTENT DOES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF LARGE AND SMALL COUNTRIES?'

1 It is a pleasure to be back at a Wilton Park Conference, and an even greater pleasure to be here in Luxembourg, a fellow traveller in the Forum of Small States and a country which my own, Singapore, admires a great deal. It is also a country which I have never visited before but which I had always wanted to. So I am very happy to have finally had the opportunity to do so.

2 Everyone will have a different answer as to what extent global governance responds to the needs of large and small countries. If we look squarely at our situation today, the answer will probably be that global governance, as it stands right now, does not satisfactorily address the needs of any of our countries, whether large, medium or small. If the global governance frameworks were sufficiently responsive and effective, we would not be grappling with the repercussions of the global economic crisis, or going around in circles on global problems like climate change.

3 The general inadequacy of the existing global governance mechanisms is precisely why we are gathered here to discuss and search for the best ways forward, and I thank Wilton Park, the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Pierre Werner Institute for organising this conference and giving me this opportunity to speak.

4 In many respects, it is still too early to try and parse out the varying degrees to which global governance responds to different groups of countries. I would say that the imperative to relook global governance frameworks only started gaining ground a little over two years ago, after the onset of the global economic crisis. (Of course some would disagree with me and say that this push to relook global governance structures started much earlier, and I am sure that some would even point to the start of discussions on UNSC reform 18 years ago in the OEWG in the UN as perhaps a key starting point for serious discussions on global governance.) Whatever the case, I would say that many are either still not fully convinced of the benefits of global governance or unsure as to what they would like to achieve from any discussion or negotiation on global governance frameworks.

5 For me, one thing is quite clear - that the United Nations, as the only entity with universal participation and legitimacy, is and must remain the central mechanism of global governance. The UN and the UN system must remain central to our efforts to improve and reform the global governance framework. However, it is also a fact that globalisation is spawning a growing variety of problems that involve specific configurations of key actors, but nevertheless have broad international ramifications if they are not speedily resolved. It is less clear what mechanisms need to be developed or augmented to take on these new governance issues, where, so to speak, the local has become global.

6 The G-20 is one mechanism that immediately comes to mind, and I will focus on this through the rest of my remarks since it has been at the forefront of the recent global governance debate. The G-20 was instrumental in helping to contain the very specific, but very globally damaging factors behind the 2008 financial crisis, so much so that it has been touted as the new force in global governance. But, as we all know, the G-20, being composed of the world's largest economies, has also sparked negative reactions from the many smaller economies that have been left out but are affected by the decisions the G-20 makes. The controversy over the G-20's role has been further fuelled as its agenda has broadened beyond core economic and financial issues.

7 What must be recognised from all this is that the evolution of a global governance framework or frameworks (depending on the problem at hand) that can meet the needs of the world today is still very much a work in progress, and a necessary one if it is to do justice to both large and small countries alike. The G-20 is a part of this evolution. But the evolution of both the G-20 and global governance as a whole is in jeopardy if it fails to gain the buy-in of all countries.

8 The question we should therefore be asking ourselves, is not whether global governance addresses the needs of large countries more than small ones, or vice versa. Instead, we should start from the assumption that global governance should address the needs of all countries, that all countries have a stake in reforming global governance, and ask how this can be effectively achieved in a manner that brings everyone onboard.

9 On the one hand, we need nimble and targeted mechanisms of governance to tackle the specialised problems that I had mentioned earlier. In the case of redressing global economic imbalances and externalities, we would not want to lose the relative speed and agility of the G-20 in facilitating vital decisions among key global economic actors. On the other hand, these mechanisms need to be consistently transparent, inclusive and consultative towards those who are not part of that group of key actors, so as to assuage their fears of being sidestepped in major decisions that greatly affect them. This does not mean including every single country, which would bog the process down. Neither does it mean referring every single decision to the UN as the ultimate representative body. Rather, these mechanisms need to incorporate channels through which external concerns and feedback can be conveyed, and to be flexible and dynamic in allowing for different configurations of participants as necessary.

10 Singapore and a number of other like-minded countries thus formed the Global Governance Group (3G) in mid-2009 to promote dialogue and cooperation between the G-20 and those outside it. We started out by advocating that the substantive participation of the UN Secretary-General and his Sherpa in G-20 meetings should be made a matter of course, so that they would be able to convey the general sense of the UN membership on all aspects and at all levels of the G-20 process. We also advocated that the participation of established regional groupings in G-20 meetings should be regularised, and that the G-20 decision-making process should adopt a "variable geometry" approach to allow non G-20 states to participate on specialised issues, thereby ensuring that deliberations can engage as many relevant parties as possible. It is greatly encouraging that successive G-20 Chairs have been steadily building up their engagement of the UN and extending their outreach to non G-20 countries. As the G-20 has demonstrated its commitment to inclusiveness, so the mistrust and pushback from the wider UN membership has started to abate quite considerably.

11 However, these negative sentiments are far from erased and to some degree will always be there on the backburner. Now that the G-20 is stepping up activity on the development front, both the opportunities and the imperative for cooperation with the UN have increased. The various funds and agencies of the UN system have all worked extensively and accumulated much expertise in the field of development. They are the competent global bodies in their respective sub-fields, and it is by working with them that the G-20 would be able to attain the best possible outcomes.

12 At some point, the G-20 would have to reach a certain level of clarity and certainty on its purpose and remit. As I had mentioned earlier, the G-20, like global governance as a whole, is still in flux and a work in progress. There have been arguments for and against the further expansion of the G-20's agenda, and as to whether the G-20 should be institutionalised. I would argue that if the purpose of the G-20 is to deal decisively with developments in the global economy, its current structure as an informal grouping would allow it to retain maximum flexibility in adapting to different circumstances and bringing in different players where necessary. Its current structure would, by definition, also be more conducive to engagement of non-G20 countries and the UN, whereas institutionalisation would add more layers of separation.

13 I would also argue that it would be beneficial for the G-20 to retain its primary focus on financial and economic issues. The G-20's remit in this respect is increasingly acknowledged for it does, after all, comprise the key actors in the financial and economic equation. There is still much to be done in this realm, and in closely related areas such as the development financing issues that the G-20 has already embarked on, as well as stagnant initiatives like the Doha Development Round, where the G-20 could prove a useful troubleshooting force. If the G-20 moves into other realms, eg UNSC reform, where the constellation of key actors might comprise different or a broader range of countries, it is likely to spark yet another backlash just as it is beginning to gain acceptance. At the end of the day, as we relook the issue of global governance, we would have to bear in mind that different specialised problems would require different configurations of key actors to resolve, but that given their global repercussions, these key actors dealing with the different issues must factor in and be accountable to those outside the configuration. How all these different configurations should relate to one another is yet something else we would have to ponder. Some have suggested the idea of a "regime complex" in the context of climate change, meaning a loosely coupled set of specific regimes, which would be more flexible and adaptable as opposed to one single comprehensive regime. I am sure that more ideas will surface as we continue to search for answers, whether in the context of climate change or the global economy.

14 Ultimately, the UN is the central forum and overarching framework where these conundrums must be sorted out, where the broadest issues of global cooperation must still be taken up, and where states must arrive at a common vision of what modern global governance should entail. But for such a discussion at the UN to be fruitful, it must also address how the UN as an organisation should reform its own internal processes in order to stay relevant and be sufficiently nimble to respond to global challenges. If the UN wants to play a central role in the evolution of global governance, it needs to examine how it can enhance its existing networks and capabilities to effectively engage all the different institutions and interests that have an impact and a stake in global issues.

15 As we move forward in this debate, we must be clear-sighted and pragmatic in our attempt to balance the competing imperatives of effectiveness and legitimacy. Otherwise, we risk descending into counter-productive quibbling over who wins or loses more in global governance, thereby crippling the process of evolution and reform even before found it has found its legs. If such a scenario comes to pass, it would be all of us who stand to lose.

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