STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BURHAN GAFOOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE, AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM, 7 MARCH 2022

1 Co-Chairs, in your letter of 11 February, you asked Member States to focus on two clusters today, namely “categories of membership” and the “question of the veto”. Singapore’s position on these two clusters is set out clearly in our input to the 2015 Framework Document, and we have repeated it many times in the IGN. Today, I will restate the key elements of our position on these two clusters. But before I do so, it is important that we collectively assess the performance of the Security Council, especially after the dramatic developments of recent days.

2 Just over a week ago, the world witnessed the disappointing failure of the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Regrettably, the veto was used to prevent swift action by the Security Council. And as a result, an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was convened under the Uniting for Peace resolution, the first time this has been done in forty years. Beyond the veto cast in the Security Council on 25 February, the voting position of every member of the Security Council, both elected and unelected, was carefully scrutinised and analysed around the world. This scrutiny of voting positions is justified because serving as a member of the Security Council is both a great privilege and an immense responsibility.

3 The reality is that developments in the last two weeks have further called into question the credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council. They have further eroded the trust that people have in the Security Council. In my view, recent developments are extremely relevant to our discussions today. At the same time, developments in the last two weeks have raised some fundamental questions about Security Council reform. Let me now identify some of these fundamental questions.

i. If the Security Council is unable to discharge its primary responsibilities in its current configuration, will a reform and expansion of the Council enhance the performance of the Council or will it lead to greater gridlock and paralysis in the Council?

ii. What are the benefits of Security Council reform and who exactly will benefit from Security Council reform? Will the United Nations system benefit from Security Council reform or is it just a handful of major powers who stand to benefit from Security Council reform? More importantly, how will small states benefit from Security Council reform?

iii. Assuming there is an expansion in permanent membership, how can we be sure that new permanent members will be committed to upholding the principles of the UN Charter? And how can we avoid a situation where new permanent members choose to advance and protect their own interests and positions, at the expense of the UN Charter and at the expense of the interests of small states?

iv. Finally, what should be the criteria for new permanent members and what safeguards can we put in place to ensure that new permanent members will defend the principles of the UN Charter and uphold international law?

4 Dear Co-Chairs, these are difficult questions but they are very pertinent. And I have to say that I do not have answers to these questions. But I believe that it is important for us in the IGN to ask these questions and to address these questions collectively. It is also important to keep in mind that the reform of the Security Council is not an end in itself. It is a means to strengthen the multilateral rules-based system that will lead to respect for the principles of the UN Charter and for international law. For many small states, their survival and very existence depends on a strong multilateral system and an effective Security Council that is able to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, for small states, the issue of Security Council reform is not an abstract issue or a numbers game but a fundamental issue of peace and security, as the events of the past two weeks have clearly shown.

5 I would like to request that the Co-Chairs reflect these questions that I have identified in the updated version of the “Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper on Convergences and Divergences on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters” (Co-Chairs IGN GA75) of 2021. In our view, it is important to have a serious and sustained discussion on these questions in the context of the work of the IGN in the weeks ahead.

6 Let me now outline Singapore’s position. From Singapore’s perspective, firstly, any reform or enlargement of the Council must enhance its credibility, legitimacy, inclusiveness and accountability. Secondly, any reform or enlargement must not disadvantage small states from seeking election to the Council on a regular basis, particularly since small states generally do not have many opportunities to serve in the Council. And thirdly, any reform or enlargement must address the interests and concerns of regions and groups that are underrepresented in the Security Council, in particular the African Group and also the small states as a group.

7 On the cluster on categories of membership, Singapore supports an expansion of seats in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. We have listened carefully and taken note of the views of the UfC that there is no need for an expansion of permanent seats. Given the recent developments in the Council, we can understand why they have taken this position. Permanent membership is a privilege that comes with special responsibilities that must be discharged fully and responsibly in support of international peace and security, and to strengthen the multilateral system. Permanent membership is not a trophy to be acquired and it is certainly not a privilege to be abused.

Co-Chairs,

8 Any reform or expansion of the Council must enhance opportunities for all member states, not just for the aspirants to permanent membership or the large and medium-sized countries. Most importantly, any enlargement should not disadvantage or further marginalise small states and SIDS. We welcome the support expressed by different groups and delegations for the representation of SIDS and small states in an expanded Council and the inclusion of this reference in the CoChairs Elements Paper. The proposal made by the UfC for a dedicated elected rotating seat for SIDS and small states is a good starting point for further discussions. We thank the UfC for their proposal but our view is that one seat for small states is not sufficient, especially since small states make up the majority of the UN membership. We therefore need to allow for even greater access for small states to be elected to the Council on a frequent basis. Singapore would not support any proposals that might negatively impact or further disadvantage small states and SIDS.

9 We also look forward to further discussion on finding a way forward that addresses the African Group’s concerns about how the Common African Position should be reflected in the Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper.

10 On the question of the veto, Singapore does not support extending the veto to any potential new permanent members. Singapore shares the view of many Member States that the veto is an impediment to a more effective and accountable Council, and to fulfilling its core mandate of maintaining international peace and security. We do not see how increasing the number of Security Council members holding veto powers would enhance the effectiveness of the Council to respond to threats to international peace and security.

11 It is clear that there is widespread support among Member States to limit the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. Like many other countries, Singapore supports limiting the use of the veto by permanent members in such situations and supports the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative. We believe that permanent members should commit themselves to not using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. We welcome France and the UK’s commitment not to use the veto in these situations and we look at that as a step in the right direction.

12 Let me conclude by saying that we fully support the IGN process and your work as Co-Chairs. The IGN offers the best chance to make progress and it is improtant that we use the IGN process wisely and patiently, in order to build the widest possible convergence of views on the key issues.

13 Thank you for your attention.

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