REMARKS BY MR MARK SEAH, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS DEBATE, TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL, 16 FEBRUARY 2023

Thank you, Co-Chairs

As this is the first time I take the floor at an IGN meeting this year, let me congratulate you both and thank Ambassador Marschick of Austria for taking on the role of Co-Chair in place of Ambassador Mlynar of the Slovak Republic. I also thank you both for your letter of 2 February 2023, which has clearly set out the timeline and areas of focus for the remaining IGN debates of this session.

Co-Chairs

2 You have invited comment on the veto, on restraint in its use and on its possible extension to new members. Allow me to make the following points:

3 First, Singapore supports making the Council more representative and inclusive. This means we support expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. But, as we have stated previously, reform should not just increase the size of the Council, but should make the Council more accountable, transparent and inclusive for everyone and not just for aspirants to permanent membership. Reform should also make for a more effective Council, one that can act in the entire membership’s collective interests in upholding international law and the UN charter.

4 Second, Singapore does not support the granting of the veto to new permanent members. We understand and acknowledge that aspirant permanent members may justifiably feel that they should have every privilege granted to the current P5, including the veto. But we ask: will granting the veto to new permanent members result in a more effective Council? Has the Council always lived up to expectations? Has the Council acted swiftly against international law violations? Or has the veto been used by individual P5 members to put their own interests before the collective interests? And, if the Council is unable to discharge its primary responsibilities as currently configured, will expansion in the number of veto-wielding permanent members enable it to do so, or lead to even more paralysis?

5 What we need, and what we expect, is a Council that can act swiftly and decisively, when confronted with global crises. We do not want a Council divided and prevented from taking action by the use of the veto. We share the view that the veto is an impediment to a more effective and accountable Council and to fulfilling the Council’s core mandate of maintaining international peace and security.

6 Third, for these reasons, Singapore supports initiatives aimed at limiting the use of the veto. We note, and are encouraged that that the Revised Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper notes that “a significant, growing number of Member States support limitations to the veto”. We welcome the commitment by France and the United Kingdom not to use the veto in such circumstances. We strongly support the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative to suspend the veto in case of mass atrocities, as well as the Veto Initiative adopted under UNGA Resolution 76/262.

7 This brings us to Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter’s stipulation that “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”. This clearly applies to all Council members, although the full text of Art 27 (3) limits this restriction to decisions taken under Chapter VI “Pacific settlement of disputes” and Art 52 (3). However, this does not seem to have been the practice of the Council.

8 In the past, some states have called out the use of vetoes that appear to have gone against Article 27 (3). Indeed, while we have become accustomed to the use of the veto to shield oneself or one’s allies from the consequences of violating international law, this does not mean that is acceptable. We ought to respect the plain meaning of Article 27 (3) and consider why Council members party to a dispute have not abstained from voting on it. 

Co-Chairs

9 We have debated today’s topic before. Recent events have made it even more pressing to consider whether the Council’s existing working methods, in particular the veto, truly work for the interests of the wider membership. If they do not, then we should think long and hard before extending this privilege to future members of an enlarged Security Council.

10 I thank you.

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