STATEMENT BY MR MARK SEAH, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE, AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE COUNCIL (IGN), 19 MARCH 2024, TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL, UNHQ, NEW YORK

Co-Chairs,

        In your letter of 12 Mar 24, you suggested that delegations consider “the working methodsof the Security Council…with a view to the points contained in last year’s Revised Co-Chairs Elements Paper, for example, the majority required for decision-making in an enlarged Security Council and adapting the working methods of the Council and its subsidiary organs to ensure its transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning”.

Co-Chairs

2       We spoke on the veto 10 days ago; and while we note your exhortation against repetition at the beginning of this year, the subject of decision-making inevitably takes us back to the subject of the veto. Your guiding question mentioned the majority required for decision-making.   Your elements paper lists diverse of proposals and views from member states on the question of the veto, [including options such as not extending the veto to new permanent members, doing so after a period of review, letting the General Assembly overrule a veto, and requiring more than one permanent member to veto a resolution].

3       On the required majority for decision making:  this has only changed once in the history of the Council, when the amendment to Article 27 (2) of the UN Charter requiring that decisions be adopted by nine out of 15 members came into force on 31 August 1965, together with the increase in the number of elected members from six to 10.  Before this, a majority of seven members was needed to pass decisions.  The 1965 expansion therefore meant that in the absence of a veto, the P5 would now require the support of four out of six elected members, or two-thirds as opposed to half.  This change gave more weight to the views of elected members, whom the P5 would have to persuade of the merits of proposed decisions to secure their support.  Any expansion of the Council should not reverse this positive change.

4       However, the greatest concern over decision-making remains the veto and how one state can use it to thwart the expressed will of many.   It is for this reason that my delegation has repeatedly said that we do not support extending the veto to potential new permanent members.  In fact, we share the view of many that the veto is an impediment to a more effective and accountable Council and to fulfilling the Council’s mandate.  The options listed in your elements paper are interesting, but will require Charter amendments that do not appear likely in the current geopolitical climate.

5       I therefore reiterate that in the absence of such Charter amendments, P5 members given the tremendous power of veto should exercise it with restraint and consideration, and not use the veto to further their individual interests.  In particular, all members of the Security Council should conform to Article 27 (3) of the Charter and its plain meaning “that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”.  It is remiss that the last time this provision was observed was by an elected member, in 1960, and I repeat that it makes a mockery of the Charter if the power of veto is used to facilitate the violation of the Charter and international law.   It is disappointing that “a more consistent application of Article 27 (3)” remains under the “divergences” section of the revised Co-Chairs Elements Paper; this is an issue that needs further discussion.

Co-Chairs,

6       I have spoken about accountability and voluntarily refraining from using the veto under certain circumstances 10 days ago, and will not repeat those points today.  I conclude by commending the fact that your revised elements paper recognises that a significant and growing number of Member States support limitations to the scope and use of the veto, and support initiatives to voluntarily refrain from its use, such as the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct.  My delegation has consistently supported these initiatives, and call on all delegations to do so.

7       Thank you.