STATEMENT BY H.E. BURHAN GAFOOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON AGENDA ITEM 27 “THE REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL”, 25 JUNE 2024, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Mr President,

1             I thank you for convening this debate in a timely fashion. I also thank the President of the Security Council for the month of June, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea, H.E. Hwang Joonkook, for introducing the report. I would also like to thank the United Kingdom for preparing the report.

2             The annual debate on the report of the Security Council is fundamentally an exercise in transparency and accountability, in accordance with Article 15 of the UN Charter. It is worth recalling that Article 24(¹) of the UN Charter makes it clear that member states confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Council and that the Council acts on behalf of members. This debate therefore represents an opportunity for members of the General Assembly to exercise their constitutional responsibility to provide oversight and feedback on possible areas for progress and improvements in the work of the Council. This feedback loop is important to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the Council. 

Mr President,

3             Allow me to make three observations on the process of the 2023 annual report, before I turn to the substance of the report. First, I commend the Council for an early adoption of its 2023 annual report before the deadline of end May as set out in Note 997 and as stipulated in OP 25 of Resolution 77/335 on the "Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”. This has allowed us to hold the debate in the General Assembly slightly earlier than last year.[1] We hope this trend continues.

4             Second, I commend the fact that this was the first time the penholder of the annual report has informally discussed the report with the larger membership before the drafting was done. I appreciate the UK’s convening of the first-ever informal consultations on the annual report in January. This finally responds to my delegation’s longstanding call for an exchange between the Council and wider UN membership when the annual report is being drafted, which in fact is in accordance with paragraph 129 of Note 507. We hope that this practice will henceforth become an annual one.

5             Third, we are disappointed with the fact that despite consistent feedback to Council members, there continues to be incomplete submission of monthly assessments by the Presidents of the Council. For 2023, almost half of Council members did not submit their monthly assessments, including two permanent members.[²] One permanent member has not submitted any monthly assessments of its Presidencies since 2017.[³] We hope that Council Presidents will take this duty of submitting monthly assessments seriously. The monthly assessments are not an optional exercise. These reports provide regular updates throughout the year on the work of the Council to the wider membership; they contribute to enhancing transparency and accountability in the work of the Council. In our view, the annual report, which is itself mandated by Article 15 of the UN Charter, is incomplete without all monthly assessments, particularly as paragraph 9 of the annual report directs member states to refer to the monthly assessments for “further information on the work of the Council and more detailed reports of its meetings”. This reference in the Annual Report is meaningless if the list of monthly assessments is incomplete. I will not mention the names of the members which have not submitted their monthly assessments, but you can find the information in a footnote in my statement which will be made available to all interested delegations.

Mr President,

6             On substance, the report again falls short of our expectations. Despite the report being 201 pages long, 180 of these pages comprise a listing and description of resolutions, statements, meetings, and other correspondence. A lot of this information is already easily available on the internet. What member states are more interested in are the Council’s assessment and perspectives on how it has performed, what are the areas of divergence and potential convergence, and how the Council might improve its performance. While we understand the difficulties with getting consensus on a comprehensive analysis of the Council’s work, we believe that Council members can make a greater effort to produce a more substantive and analytical introductory chapter. If the Council is not able to provide an analytical overview of its own performance, then it is perhaps time, high time, for the General Assembly to prepare its own analysis and assessment of the performance of the Security Council. I leave this suggestion for the reflection of all members of the General Assembly.

7             Let me identify two areas where substantive analysis would help member states’ understanding of the work of the Council. First, it is clear that the unity of the Council has declined significantly in 2023 and since the beginning of the year in 2024, as demonstrated by the increasing use of the veto. In 2023, six vetoes were cast on five resolutions, an increase from four vetoes cast on three resolutions in 2022. The sharp decline in Council unity is further demonstrated by the high number of resolutions that failed to be adopted due to insufficient votes, and the lowest ever number of presidential statements in 2023.[⁴] In other words, the Council is facing the risk of becoming a platform for public posturing, a stage for political theatre, and a megaphone for geopolitical narratives. In 2023, the fact that the Council took over a month before it finally adopted Resolution 2712 in response to the conflict in Gaza simply served to underline the polarisation and paralysis in its work; the General Assembly, on the other hand, was able to respond within the same month the conflict broke out with the adoption of a resolution at an Emergency Session (ES 10/21).

8             Unfortunately, it does not look like things will get any better this year. We are only halfway through the year, and we have already seen six vetoes on five resolutions. These are the same figures as those for the entirety of 2023, and do not include the threats of veto and “pocket vetoes”. At a time of deepening tensions all over the world, it is disappointing to see a fractured Council. This warrants deep reflection on whether members, in particular permanent members who frequently resort to the veto, are committed to the call in Note 507 (paragraphs 74 to 77) for “Intra-Council Cooperation and Consultation”, or whether this is absent because it is outweighed by the need to pander to narrow national interests and posture to the gallery. 

9             Second, the annual report appears to indicate that member states are increasingly uncomfortable with resort to peacekeeping and sanctions, both of which are key tools of the Council in maintaining international peace and security, short of authorising the use of force. The annual report, for example, acknowledged that these tools “faced scrutiny”, with “unease among some member states regarding the efficacy” of these mechanisms in certain contexts. In this regard, the question arises as to the role of the Council in preventive diplomacy. The Council needs to move away from simply managing conflicts after they have erupted, towards a more effective use of the tools of preventive diplomacy, including by examining how the main organs of the UN, such as the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Peacebuilding Commission can work together to this end. Additionally, Article 99 of the UN Charter is one of the most powerful tools at the Secretary-General’s disposal for preventive diplomacy. In this regard, it was significant that the Secretary-General invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter in December 2023 to ask the Council to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and call for a humanitarian ceasefire. Yet, this was not mentioned in the annual report beyond a cursory listing of the reference number of the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. We hope that the Council will reflect seriously on the Secretary-General’s role in contributing to preventive diplomacy, and how the Council might react more effectively, substantively, and supportively to the use of Article 99.

10           Let me conclude on a positive note. Singapore is heartened to see that the Council is starting to look at the impact of non-traditional issues on international peace and security, including the open debate organised by the Republic of Korea on cybersecurity just last week, and Malta’s signature event on children and armed conflict in April 2024. We were also pleased to see the adoption of Switzerland’s Resolution 2730 (2024) on the protection of humanitarian and UN personnel in conflict zones in May, which Singapore co-sponsored. In 2023, there were also pertinent debates on sea-level rise, climate change, and transnational organised crime. All these follow a long line of important initiatives that the Council had previously considered, including Resolution 2664 (2022) that created humanitarian carveouts for sanctions and Resolution 1325 (2000) which first put the Women, Peace and Security Agenda on the Council’s agenda. These are important achievements of the Council, and we urge the Council to continue to push the envelope in exploring the interlinkages between new and emerging challenges, and international peace and security, and not to cling to outmoded and narrow definitions of peace and security, especially if the Council wishes to remain relevant as the actor responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr President,

11           I conclude with a final observation. The United Nations is at an inflection point, and so is multilateralism. This year, we take stock of our progress just ahead of the organisation’s 80^th anniversary, and our decisions will determine our course for the next decade and beyond. The Security Council, as the guardian of international peace and security, should be the centre of this reflection, review, and stock-taking exercise. I urge member states to consider how the Council might ensure its relevance going into the future, and to reflect our goals for the Security Council and its reform in concrete and ambitious terms in the Pact for the Future.

12           I thank you for your attention.

.     .     .     .     .

[1]           The debate was held on 30 June in 2023.

[2]           The following Council members did not submit their monthly assessments in 2023: Russia (April), US (August), Albania (September), Brazil (October), and Ecuador (December).

[3]           The US has not submitted its monthly assessments since 2017.

[4]           Eight resolutions failed due to insufficient votes in 2023, compared with three in 2022. In 2023, there were only six presidential statements, down from the previous low of seven presidential statements in 2022.